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From Europe to the Arab Peninsula? – Cultural 
Diplomacy Practices in the United Arab Emirates
Abstract
This paper analyzes the practice of “cultural diplomacy” and “soft power” 
in the United Arab Emirates in light of previously developed practices 
in European countries such as France and Germany. These two concepts 
referred to international relations and invented in the Western world, de-
scribe strategies that have been taken up by non-Western governments, 
either to complement their hard power capacity with its soft equivalent or 
to fi ll a gap where hard power is missing. Diverse (especially state) actors 
in international relations appear convinced that public and cultural di-
plomacy, as an example of soft power, is the most advanced, non-invasive 
way of conveying a positive image, values, or lifestyle, being at the same 
time a non-violent means of pursuing national interests. How is the con-
cept of cultural diplomacy applied and facilitated in non-Western coun-
tries? Which model of public diplomacy best describes actions undertaken 
by the Emirati authorities and what are the reason for developing a soft 
power strategy in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)? This article answers 
these questions through a comparative analysis of the United Arab Emir-
ates with the examples of France and Germany. It points out the potential 
challenges and opportunities which arise from a non-Western government 
using a tool of cultural diplomacy by analyzing diverse initiatives under-
taken by UAE, including the “Emirati Film Review in Poland”. 
Keywords: Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Foreign 
Policy, United Arab Emirates, France, Germany
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Introduction
Public and cultural diplomacy in the United Arab Emirates has only 
been used in an institutionalized form very recently. It is interesting and 
important to explore how these practices are adjusted and implemented 
by non-Western states, especially in the context of historical experiences, 
cultural background, and geopolitical goals which are different from those 
in Europe and North America. European countries started to institution-
alize culture in the early 20th century. Cultural institutions such as the 
Alliance Française, the British Council, and (later) the Goethe Institute 
are French, British, and German examples. The reasons for governments 
to use public and cultural diplomacy are numerous. Nowadays, many po-
litical scientists describe culture used by states as “soft power”, which 
may complement or replace “hard power”, i.e., the military or economic 
strength of a state.1 Hence, public or cultural diplomacy used as a soft 
power tool may be very helpful for governments which lack hard power 
means. Using public and cultural diplomacy, however, in order to facilitate 
national interest or foreign policy goals is a complex process with many 
variables requiring consideration while planning and designing strategies 
in the fi eld. The reasons for the UAE government to develop its own soft 
power strategy result from the globalization, geopolitical situation and 
foreign policy goals which are briefl y analyzed in the following sections 
in order to answer the question: why does the UAE need soft power tools 
such as public and cultural diplomacy?
The interdisciplinary character of cultural and public diplomacy 
means that the numerous terms used to describe it are confusing and con-
fl icted. This problem is compounded by the extensive literature on the 
subject. To compare Emirati and European public and cultural diplomacy 
in a clear manner it is best to approach the topic primarily from the per-
spective of one discipline. Thus, this article refers to the work of political 
scientists such as Eytan Gilboa and Martin Zamorano and applies models 
developed by them to describe public and cultural diplomacy in the UAE, 
France, and Germany. These models offer a useful way to frame public 
and cultural diplomacy and allow comparison between them. By examin-
ing these contexts through a descriptive analysis and presenting case stud-
ies such as the “French Summer Cinema Pavilion”, the “German Cinema 
Week”, and the “Emirati Film Review in Poland”, I will show differences 
not only at the macro level of geopolitics and international relations but 
also at the micro level, which involves the practical dimension of working 
1  J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New 
York 2004, p. 5.
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with cultural diplomacy in the fi eld. Such comparison may allow interna-
tional relations scholars to predict directions of possible developments in 
the UAE strategies for public and cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, Emi-
rati policymakers drawing on experience of their European counterparts 
may use the comparison as an indicator on how to adjust and improve soft 
power tools to specifi c political context and needs. Finally, this is an at-
tempt to systemize Emirati public and cultural diplomacy within existing 
theoretical framework.
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section defi nes the concepts of 
cultural and public diplomacy by discussing models and types offered by 
political scientists in light of soft power theory. The French and the Ger-
man models of cultural diplomacy are presented in section three; these 
can be understood as the Western archetypes of public and cultural di-
plomacy. Section four presents the geopolitical situation of the United 
Arab Emirates, as well as the history and the characteristics of Emirati 
statehood and recent developments in the fi eld of public and cultural di-
plomacy. The analysis takes place in section fi ve, where examples and case 
studies of public and cultural diplomacy as soft power tools are discussed 
and compared. The sixth section offers a conclusion.
Theory and Methodology
The concepts of public and cultural diplomacy are very often exam-
ined through the lens of diverse disciplines. Likewise, it is related and 
sometimes confused with terms such as international public relations, 
branding, advocacy or international cultural relations. The ongoing de-
bate on the nature and coherent defi nition of public and cultural diplo-
macy, however, is not the subject of this article. Hence, in this paper cul-
tural diplomacy is understood as a subcategory of public diplomacy or 
its instrument which uses cultural heritage and the resources of a state 
to pursue its national interests through foreign policy goals. Nick Cull 
described cultural diplomacy as the activities: “to manage the interna-
tional environment through making [that nation’s] cultural resources 
and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmis-
sion abroad”.2
Therefore, the question of who is responsible for cultural exports is 
a major preoccupation for scholarship. However, for the purposes of this 
paper, the focus is on the role of the government, obviously, as long as 
cultural diplomacy amounts to policy which aims at encouraging public 
2  N. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons for the Past, FIGUEROA Press, Los Angeles 
2009, p. 19.
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opinion to infl uence a foreign government and its attitudes towards the 
sender country.3 
The perspective presented above by Manuela Aguilar is reaffi rmed in the 
foreign policy defi nitions and goals used by other international relations 
scholars. For instance, in a list of the functions of foreign policy, Renata 
Włoch4 suggests that the adaptative and representational-informational 
function could be fulfi lled by tools such as public or cultural diplomacy. 
Józef Kukułka,5 on the other hand, specifi es ensuring security, increas-
ing the power of the state, and strengthening its international position as 
major foreign policy goals. Especially in a fi eld of increasing power and in-
ternational positioning, cultural and public diplomacy may be signifi cant 
tools which can effectively accomplish the aims of foreign policy. Such an 
understanding of the role and goals of foreign policy is clearly refl ected in 
Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power and the liberal paradigm of international 
relations where the importance of public opinion and its impact on politi-
cal decision making is highlighted. The theory quite aptly explains states’ 
reasoning to develop public and cultural diplomacy.
Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a nation’s values, culture, 
and policies.6 It causes people to act through cooperation rather than du-
ress and obligation. When the values, culture, and policies of states or 
nonstate actors have moral authority or are seen as legitimate in the eyes of 
others, their soft power is increased.7 From the perspective of government 
policies, the difference between hard and soft power in states’ activities is 
that hard power would amount to coercive diplomacy, war, and alliance 
in the military sphere, or sanctions and bribe in the economic sphere, 
whereas public diplomacy is presented as an offi cial policy translating soft 
power resources, such as cultural heritage and values, into action”.8 To 
make it simple, the main difference between them is coercion and force 
on the one hand and collaboration and attraction on the other. To sum-
marize, for the purpose of this analysis, public and cultural diplomacy are 
examined from the perspective of political science, being understood as 
3  M. Aguilar, Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-American Relations 
1955–1968, Peter Lang, New York 1996, pp. 10–11.
4  R. Włoch, Funkcje polityki zagranicznej państwa (State’s Foreign Policy Functions), 
in: Wstęp do polityki zagranicznej państwa (Introduction to the Theory of the State’s Foreign 
Policy), ed. R. Zięba, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, p. 124.
5  J. Kukułka, Międzynarodowe Stosunki Polityczne (International political relations), 
PWN, Warszawa 1980, p. 43.
6  J. Nye, op. cit., p. 6 
7  E. Gilboa, Searching for a theory of public diplomacy, „The Annals of the American 
Academy of political and social science”, no. 3/2008, p. 57.
8  Ibidem, p. 61.
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foreign policy tools designed to fulfi ll national interests through informa-
tion, cooperation, and non-coercive means which is refl ected in Joseph 
Nye’s soft power theory.
Comparative Analysis and Case Studies
To compare practices and approaches towards cultural and public di-
plomacy in the UAE, France, and Germany, a methodological framework 
is also required. Comparative analysis and case studies are methods of-
ten used in political science. They both help researchers to frame reality 
or phenomena and construct theories and models. Through comparative 
analysis, scholars are able to highlight similarities and differences among 
actors and programs. Etan Gilboa9 indicates several categories of case 
studies in public diplomacy including actors, such as a particular state, in-
ternational organization, or NGOs; public diplomacy instruments such as 
international broadcasting or cultural diplomacy; target states or regions; 
and individual leaders. Alexander George offered an interesting approach 
to comparative research in public diplomacy which he called a “struc-
tured focused comparison”.10 This structure systematizes the instruments 
of public diplomacy depending on the time range and involvement of 
the government. Three time-dimensions are proposed: immediate, inter-
mediate, and long. Each indicates different goals and means, attitudes 
to communication techniques and public opinion, a different degree of 
a government commitment, and therefore the choice of relevant public 
diplomacy instruments. Interestingly, cultural diplomacy in George’s 
structure is a public diplomacy instrument designed for long-term results, 
remotely linked to government with the purpose of building relationships 
and favorable conditions for government operations through media and 
public opinion. Having examined public and cultural diplomacy using 
the aforementioned methodology we are able to indicate most signifi cant 
variables and relations between them and therefore organize our knowl-
edge by constructing diverse models. 
Models & Types
Etan Gilboa in his article “Searching for Public Diplomacy Theory”11 
amongst others came up with following public diplomacy models: the 
9  Ibidem, p. 70.
10  A. George, Case studies and theory development: The method of structured, focused 
comparison, in: Diplomacy: New approaches in history, theory and policy, ed. P. Gordon 
Lauren, Free Press, New York 1979, pp. 43–68.
11  E. Gilboa, op. cit., p. 59.
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Basic Cold War model, and the Domestic PR model. He used fi ve vari-
ables to distinguish between them: major actors, initiators, goals, types of 
media, and means and techniques. In the Basic Cold War model, public 
TV, newspapers, and radio stations are used by the government to con-
duct public diplomacy. In the Domestic PR model, the government hires 
PR fi rms, NGOs, or even lobbyists in the target country to achieve its 
goals. As Gilboa quite aptly noted, “the establishment of a local support 
group or a movement in the target country could also strengthen the le-
gitimacy and authenticity of the campaign. A local PR fi rm or NGO is 
likely to know best how to achieve the desired goals in a given political 
and cultural context […]”12 Gilboa’s models fi t into Alexander’s George 
framework for comparison where cultural diplomacy is only a Public Di-
plomacy instrument. Martin Zamorano, however, presents an approach 
which is more centered on cultural diplomacy and which explains its 
character and nature as more autonomous phenomenon, characterized by 
policies belonging to diverse models, “centralized” and “agencied” (or 
“delegated”),13 which we can collate with Gilboa’s Cold War and Domestic 
PR models. A centralized model is characterized by a well-marked state 
presence with a greater national tone. As an example, Zamorano discusses 
France where cultural diplomacy is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Culture and Communications and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An 
agencied model is based on the “arm’s length” principle concept. It in-
volves the establishment of agencies (usually the quasi-nongovernmental 
organizations – quango) with less marked reference to government as well 
as autonomy in cultural design indirectly fulfi lling foreign policy goals. 
The British Council serves well as an example, since it is dependent on 
the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce but with pri-
vate sponsorship and quango’s structure.
Most states operate within either the “agencied” or “centralised” sys-
tem, but mixed models are also present. According to Andreas Wiesand, in 
Europe, two thirds out of 44 countries have inter-ministerial cultural di-
plomacy and 21 of these states maintain cultural centers abroad, although 
not all under the arm’s length principle.14 Zamorano, building on the pre-
12  E. Gilboa, op. cit., p. 55.
13  M. Zamorano, Cultural diplomacy Defi nition historical evolution and current trends, 
Teaching materials for the Postgraduate Diploma on International Cultural Coopera-
tion and Management, Universitat de Barcelona 2015, p. 9, https://www.academia.
edu/24217940/Cultural_diplomacy_Defi nition_historical_evolution_and_current_
trends (access 2.10.2020).
14  A. Wiesand, National Policies Infl uencing Cultural Cooperation and Mobility in 
Europe An overview of Research Results, European Institute for Comparative Cultural 
Research, Bonn 2007, p. 5.
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vious work of Villanueva,15 Chartrand16 and Zahrana,17 offers two types of 
cultural diplomacy: culturalist and neopropagandist; however, only one 
of them is presented positively. The culturalist type “emphasizes the cul-
tural value of heritage, arts, and identities (as opposed to prioritizing their 
instrumental form), assumes at the same time the relative absence of gov-
ernmental control over the creative process linked to artistic diffusion”.18 
On the contrary, the neopropagandist neopropagandist type represents 
the instrumental use of culture by a state and is limited to “unilateral 
dissemination of cultural content that shows a positive view of the politi-
cal territory in question”.19 These types of cultural diplomacy (culturalist 
and neopropogandist) are reinforced by soft power theory, usually involve 
the transnational private sector, and eventually lead to reduction of social 
participation.20 Hence, the neopropagandist type represents a purely in-
strumental use of culture in order to fulfi ll national interests without any 
effort to engage the addressees in dialogue. 
The models and types presented above signifi cantly differ one from an-
other. Gilboa’s models always recognize government participation in cul-
tural diplomacy and only the extent of its involvement may vary. Zamo-
rano describes the culturalist type as one where government commitment 
is not observed. The question remains, however, of what is meant by 
“relative absence of governmental control” and what would distinguish 
this type of cultural diplomacy from international cultural relations as 
defi ned by Richard Arndt.21 Gilboa also pays more attention not only to 
actors and goals, but also to techniques and the time range of researched 
activities. Zamorano tends to look into the motivations behind cultural 
15  C. Villanueva, Representing Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Cosmopolitan Con-
structivism and Nation Branding in Mexico and Sweden, Växjö University Press, Växjö 
2007, p. 38.
16  H. Chartrand, International cultural affairs: a 14 country survey, „Journal of Arts 
Management”, Law & Society, Ottawa, no. 22/1992, pp. 134–154.
17  R. Zaharna, Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives, in: Routledge 
Handbook of Public Diplomacy, eds. by N. Snow, P. Taylor, Routledge, New York 2009, 
pp. 86–100.
18  M. Zamorano, Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The Instrumentalization of Culture 
under the Soft Power Theory”, Culture Unbound, no. 8, Linköping University Electronic 
Press, Linköping, 2016, p. 178.
19  Ibidem, p. 179.
20  R. Ulldemolins, M. Zamorano, Spain’s nation branding project Marca España and 
its cultural policy: the economic and political instrumentalization of a homogeneous and sim-
plifi ed cultural image, „International Journal of Cultural Policies”, no. 1/2014, p. 21.
21  R. Arndt, Cultural Diplomacy, Political Infl uence, and Integrated Strategy, in: 
Strategic Infl uence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare, ed. 
M.J. Waller, Institute of World Politics Press, Washington DC 2009, p. 74.
158
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 4/2020
diplomacy, taking a quite judgmental position in which the culturalist 
prevails over the neopropagandist type, which already has in its name 
a pejorative link to propaganda. The problem with such an outlook was 
well addressed by Radosław Zendereowski who said that scholars assign-
ing cultural diplomacy purely to the role of “creating the atmosphere of 
trust and understanding and building interest in life and values of the 
nations is somewhat wishful thinking. These authors tend to ascribe to 
states intentions characteristic of cultural people and a kind of empathy 
and the ability to understand other cultures. In reality, states pursue their 
goals, which are often egoistic in nature”.22 Therefore, I presume that the 
neopropagandist type of cultural diplomacy may appear more relevant to 
monarchies and authoritarian regimes, whereas governments could be 
interested in unilateral communication instead of dialogue with the audi-
ence. However, this needs to be reaffi rmed in the analysis below.
France & Germany the Western Archetypes 
of Public and Cultural Diplomacy
France and Germany are examples of European countries recognized 
amongst “precursors” of cultural diplomacy. They are both very creative, 
using art, fi lm, music, and literature and design in the promotion of their 
culture and heritage and thereby in the implementation of the policies set 
by their national governments. Both countries are able to use their unique 
cultural products worked out over the years. Although, they represent 
different approaches to cultural diplomacy, their experience may serve as 
precedent in planning public and cultural diplomacy strategies.23
France
French cultural diplomacy is performed under the auspices and super-
vision of the Ministry of Culture and Communication and of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. It has at its disposal both a network of 96 French Insti-
tutes around the world and over 800 branches of Alliance Françaises. The 
concept of French culture as a “civilizing mission” is strongly expressed 
22  R. Zenderowski, Uczestnicy i kreatorzy międzynarodowych stosunków kulturalnych 
(Participants and creators of international cultural relations), in: Międzynarodowe Stosunki 
Kulturalne (International Cultural Relations), eds. R. Zenderowski, K. Cebul, M. Kry-
cki, PWN, Warszawa 2010, p. 152.
23  Primary activity of the cultural institutes in both cases, was the teaching of 
French and German languages respectively. The analysis carried out by the author 
however, leaves this part of the activity of French and German cultural diplomacy 
outside the spectrum of interest.
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in the offi cial doctrine of having cultural diplomacy as a foreign policy 
tool. This assumes the use of the attractiveness of French art, thought, 
and technology abroad.24 Cultural diplomacy has been discussed in a se-
ries of important political documents, including “Rapport pour le prési-
dent de la République sur la France et la mondialisation”25 by Hubert 
Védrine, “La France et l’Europe dans le monde: livre blanc sur la poli-
tique étrangère et européenne de la France, 2008–2020”26 by Alain Juppé 
and Louis Schweitzer, and the acting law “LOI n°. 2010-873 du 27 juillet 
2010 relative à l’action extérieure de l’Etat”.27
France stressed the importance of culture in its foreign policy after the 
Second World War. It was affected by the postwar reality where France went 
“from the status of a weak major power to something less”.28 Through the 
use of culture and its cultural capital, France was trying to manage its posi-
tion in the new international order. Since then culture was the key element 
to “validate/elevate its national brand in a globalized world”.29 In French 
cultural diplomacy, multilateral organization with state-level represen-
tation is observed, where language is the main component. The concept 
of Francophonie based on a common heritage and language established 
a safeguard in upholding the alliance between the ex-colonies, countries 
with a signifi cant French language population, and France itself. In 2019, 
L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie encompassed 56 mem-
ber states, 2 associate members, and 13 observers. As Kevin Mulcahy has ar-
gued: “Aesthetic, linguistic, and stylistic concerns have been long-standing 
political issues that have generated a strong French commitment to cultural 
diplomacy. Indeed, the glories of French civilization have long been seen 
as a refl ection of national greatness and have for long periods been eagerly 
adopted by other nations as a model worthy of imitation”.30 
Hence, France has a reputation which allows lifestyle, values, and cul-
tural heritage transmission to other countries. But certainly, it required 
24  K. Mulcahy, Public Culture, Cultural Identity, Cultural Policy, Palgrave, New 
York 2017, p. 47.
25  H. Védrine, Rapport pour le président de la République sur la France et la mondiali-
sation Fayard, Paris 2007.
26  A. Juppé , L.Schweitzer, La France et l’Europe dans le monde: livre blanc sur la 
politique étrangère et européenne de la France, 2008–2020, Collection des rapports of-
fi ciels, Paris 2008.
27  LOI n° 2010-873 of 27th July 2010 relating to the State’s external action, Leg-
islatif Dossier 2008.
28  H. Lebovics, Mona Lisa’s Escort: André Malroux and the Reinvention of French 
Culture, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1999, p. 5.
29  K. Mulcahy, op. cit., p. 52.
30  Ibidem, p. 38.
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years of engaging with its counterparts convincing them about advan-
tages of a “French attitude” on the one hand and the conscious ability to 
answer the question of what it means to be French on the other.
As a case study of the practical application of French cultural diplo-
macy, fi lm events organized and co-organized by the French Institute in 
Poland are presented below. The Pavilion of French Summer Cinema (fr. 
“Pavillon Estival du Cinem Français) is part of an event called “Summer 
Cinem Pavilion” (pl. “Pawilon Kina Letniego”) organized on a yearly ba-
sis by the National Museum in Kraków. Films are screened from July 
until September in the city center, in the open air, on one of the walls 
of the museum buildings. The admission is free of charge after previous 
registration. The event is offi cially supported by the French Institute and 
French Consulate General in Krakow. Amongst private entities in the 
project there is a small cafeteria, “Petite France”. The thematic scope of 
the fi lms varied in the year??, including contemporary French fi lms and 
many others. Similarly, The French Institute in Warsaw participates in 
an initiative called the “Film Capital of Summer” (pl. “Filomwa Stolica 
Lata”) organized from July until September in Warsaw in 18 diverse and 
very attractive locations.31 Amongst the partners, which comprise both 
local authorities and private entities, French Institute is the only cultural 
institute partnering with this project. Admission is also free of charge.
The “Review of the New French Cinema” is one of the initiatives ex-
clusively organized to show French fi lm productions. In 2020, the 11th it-
eration was held. Usually fi lms are screened during one week in different 
Polish cities and towns32 in intimate studio cinemas. The difference from 
aforementioned events is that tickets are charged according to cinemas’ 
pricelists. The review gives the audience an opportunity to see a wide 
range of fi lm genres, including drama, comedy, and documentary.
In an attempt to fi t these three examples of French cultural diplomacy 
in Poland into a theoretical framework, on top of the means which were 
used (fi lm screenings), we need to identify the goals, time range, and 
major entities involved. The major entities are easy to identify from the 
31  DOK Ursynów, Dorożkarnia, Filmoteka Narodowa, Kamionkowskie Błonia 
Elekcyjne, Kępa Potocka, Kopa Cwila, Ursynów, Muzeum Warszawy Lapidarium, 
Niepodległa – miejsce spotkań, Ogród Saski, Park, Henrykowski, Białołęka, Park nad 
Balatonem, Park Polińskiego, Park Szymańskiego, Parking Arcelormittal, Plaża Ro-
mantyczna, Royal Wilanów, Urząd Dzielnicy Wilanów, Wola Park.
32  Warszawa – Kino Muranów; Katowice – Kino Światowid; Toruń – Kino Cen-
trum; Łódź – Kino Charlie; Wrocław – Kino Nowe Horyzonty; Zamość – CKF Sty-
lowy; Szczecin – Kino Pionier; Białystok – Kino Forum; Olsztyn – Kino Awangarda 
2; Poznań – Kino Muza, Gdańsk – Klub Żak; Kraków – Kino Pod Baranami, Sala 
kinowa w Małopolskim Ogrodzie Sztuki; Radom – MCSW Elektrownia.
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description above. We can see that the French model could be a represen-
tation of what Zamorano called the “agencied” approach. Despite occa-
sional involvement of the French Consulate General, the French Institute 
remains the major perpetuator. Its cooperation with non-governmental 
actors, such as cinemas, NGOs, and entrepreneurs but also governmental 
institutions, such as the National Museum or local authorities, seems to 
be crucial for implementing cultural diplomacy projects. “The French 
Institutes however, are subordinated to the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and a large part of their budget comes from a state subsidy”.33 
Therefore, it would be mistaken to use one model for describing both 
British and French strategies for cultural diplomacy. For this reason, it 
is more appropriate to describe French model rather as centralized than 
agencied. The time range should not be described only by the time of par-
ticular event, for example a given week or month, but also its regularity, 
i.e., a yearly basis. 
These two factors indicate so far that the French cultural diplomacy 
model in Poland fi ts the purpose of the PR Domestic model proposed by 
Gilboa, but it should be further reaffi rmed by the goals of these projects 
which are not explicit, and in order to identify them we need to have 
a look at French foreign policy goals in Poland. These can be found in 
detail in the offi cial communication on the webpage of The Foreign Af-
fairs Ministry of the Republic of France,34 but we can also summarize as 
follows: “Poland and France strive to strengthen the political dialogue in 
the fi eld of security and defense, education, science and culture, and the 
economy, as well as to coordinate positions at the European level, so as 
to jointly create the Europe of tomorrow”.35 Hence, we can assume that 
long-term French cultural diplomacy projects may help achieving foreign 
policy goals through non-coercive transmission of cultural content into 
diverse spheres of Polish society, thus creating a positive atmosphere and 
attitude towards France. Obviously, the elite and intellectuals of major 
cities are aimed as the audience of events such as “Pavilion of the French 
Summer Cinema”, but the fact that the “Review of the New French Cin-
33  Z. Kisielewska, Promocja kultury francuskiej za granicą – Instytut Frnacuski 
(Promotion of French Culture Abroad – French Institute), in: Europejskie Modele Polityki 
Kulturlanej  (European Models of Cultural Policy), eds. B. Gierat-Bieroń, K. Kowalski, 
Małopolska Szkoła Administracji Publicznej Akademii Ekonomicznej Kraków 2005, 
p. 111.
34  French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coun-
try-fi les/poland/ (access 2.10.2020).
35 Onet.pl, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/emmanuel-macron-w-polsce- 
ambasador-z-uwaga-obserwujemy-francje/rjhr9rg (access 2.10.2020).
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ema” takes place amongst other cities in Radom, Olsztyn and Zamość 
indicates a willingness to broaden the scope of the potential audience.
Germany 
In the West Germany, the, time after Second World War was a period 
of actively constructing a strategy of cultural diplomacy, although it 
was hampered by the events of the global confl ict that had just ended. 
In order to create a coherent image abroad, taking into account the 
diffi cult experiences of the war, West Germany proposed a strategy of 
cultural diplomacy in which independent, non-governmental organiza-
tions have a mandate to represent German culture. This division was to 
ensure an objective representation detached from political power and 
party politics.36
Currently, after reunifi cation of Germany, three institutions are main-
ly responsible for German cultural policy. DAAD (German Academic 
Exchange Service) works in the area of  students’ mobility and teaching 
German at a university level. The Alexander von Humboldt Association 
deals with international research in Germany and international research 
projects. The Goethe Institute aims to represent German culture and lan-
guage abroad, outside the academic community and to create a contem-
porary image of Germany in the world. 
The Goethe Institute is the largest of the three organizations with 
a network of 169 language schools and cultural centers worldwide.37 Al-
though the Institute is independent of the German federal government, 
its main directions of activity are discussed with the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs every year. While creating the aforementioned narra-
tive, the activities of the Institute focus on the topics of the Third Reich, 
East Germany, reunifi cation, and multiculturalism in Germany. Works of 
literature, art, music, and fi lm are used to engage the international com-
munity in dialogue with Germany on the image and culture of their coun-
try. German cultural diplomacy is favored by the fact that the country 
has abandoned the elite approach to culture promoted by the Frankfurt 
School. The Germans stress that cultural exchange is the dominant prin-
ciple in their international cultural policy. The importance of festivals as 
a means of cultural diplomacy is also clear, as cultural festivals themselves 
36  I. Herrschner, The Role of Art in German Cultural Diplomacy: An Analysis of the 
Festival of German Films in Melbourne, Australia, Media Transformations no. 11/2015, 
p. 125.
37  Goethe Institute Annual Report 2019–2020, https://www.goethe.de/resources/
fi les/pdf202/gi_jahrbuch_2020.pdf (access 29.10.2020). 
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act as cultural diplomacy, creating a space for discussion and exchange of 
ideas for audiences and artists.38
In Poland, the “German Cinema Week” has been organized annually for 
over 20 years. Originally, these were local events taking place in Krakow, 
Warsaw, or cities in south-west Poland. Six years ago, the organizers of 
these screenings (Goethe-Institut in Warsaw and Kraków, and the Nurem-
berg House in Krakow and the German Consulate General in Wrocław) 
decided to join forces and present a joint program for the German Film 
Week in several cinemas across Poland.39 The screenings are organized 
in the local studio cinemas and tickets are charged according to cinemas’ 
pricelists. Each iteration of this presentation of German cinema is a display 
of various fi lm genres dealing with many topics, with particular emphasis 
on those with relevance to contemporary Germany and to circumstances 
the artists and directors working in Germany react immediately. Addition-
ally in 2019, Q&A sessions with Cordula Kablitz-Post, the director of the 
fi lm “Die Toten Hosen on tour” (2019), took place in Wrocław and Poznań 
and a Q&A session with Mohammad Farokhmanesh, the director of the 
“Little Germans” (2018), was organized in Kraków and Wrocław.
Germany follows the agencied or delegated model, with the Goethe 
Institute as the main actor behind German cultural diplomacy in Poland. 
The national element, however, is more prominently highlighted in the 
content of the programme, closely connected to a historical narrative but 
also to current issues within German society. The Domestic PR model 
determinants are fulfi lled with a time range which is long-term and the 
participation of local studio cinemas, which have their own particular au-
dience mainly consisting of intellectuals and the elite. Again, the tenden-
cy to broaden the audience was marked by a jointly drafted programme 
and by extending the list of screening locations. The goals are in line with 
the general activity of Goethe Institute which is creating a positive im-
age of contemporary Germany and engaging the public into dialogue on 
problems such as the Holocaust or multiculturalism which also amount 
to German foreign policy goals.
 
UAE – Cultural and Public Diplomacy Beyond 
the Western World
In the past four decades, the United Arab Emirates has become one 
of the most dynamic and successful forces in the MENA region. From 
38  I. Herrschner, op. cit., p. 126. 
39  Wrocław, Kraków, Gdańsk, Katowice, Opole, Kielce, Poznań, Zielona Góra, 
Gorzów Wielkopolski, Łódź, Rzeszów, Warszawa.
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a small monarchic federation with a tribal society and little experience 
of statehood, it reached the point where ‘The Economist’ magazine has 
referred to it as ‘Little Sparta,’ emphasizing the UAE’s growing hard 
power capabilities.40 On the other hand, the UAE’s soft power is under 
constant development, with a vision of transforming itself into a global 
player acting through tolerance and understanding to achieve peace and 
prosperity. The geopolitics of the country are complex. Iran on the other 
side of the Gulf is perceived as the biggest threat to UAE security, which 
forces Emirates to make alliances with Saudi Arabia, for example, and to 
maneuver between the USA and China. Economic competition, through 
maintaining trade relations with most parts of the World and counterbal-
ancing the infl uence of other players such as Turkey, is another challenge. 
Finally, the internal demographic situation, with an uneven ratio between 
the incoming population and the autochthons pushes the UAE to keep 
close relations with India, which is the motherland for the majority of 
migrants in the Emirates. All these aspects have to be considered while 
planning foreign policy directions and the best tools to fulfi ll its goals. 
Soft power through public and cultural diplomacy has gained importance 
as complementary to the developing hard power of the country.
Legal & Institutional Framework
Refl ective of this strategy, several steps were taken in order to incor-
porate a soft power strategy, including cultural diplomacy actions into 
the Emirati legal system. First was the foundation of the UAE Soft Power 
Council in 2017. The UAE Soft Power Council was supposed to review all 
the legislation and policies that have an impact on the UAE’s image and 
reputation abroad. Just a few months after its foundation, it published 
the UAE Soft Power Strategy in September 2017. This strategy aims to 
increase the country’s global reputation abroad by highlighting its iden-
tity, heritage, culture, and contributions to the world. It also revealed the 
global and regional aspirations of the country through four objectives:
“–  to develop a unifi ed direction for various sectors including the 
economy, humanities, tourism, media, and science
–  to promote the UAE’s position as a gateway to the region
–  to establish the UAE as a regional capital for culture, art and tourism
–  to establish its reputation as a modern and tolerant country that 
welcomes all people from across the world”.41
40  The Economist,  https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-andafrica/21720319-
driven-energetic-crown-price-uae-building-basesfar-beyond-its (access 30.09.2020).
41  Emirates News Agency, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302634954 (access 2.10.2020).
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Secondly, the governmental conference titled The Future of Culture 
Retreat was organized in 2018. The “UAE Cultural Development Fund” 
and the “Creative Industries Contributions Index” were initiated in the 
venue by the Prime Minister and the Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed 
bin Rashid Al Maktoum. The event brought together a number of cabinet 
ministers and senior government offi cials to work on the implementa-
tion of a comprehensive development plan for innovative cultural ini-
tiatives and projects. The “UAE Cultural Development Fund” provided 
the necessary funds to support the proposed cultural activities within the 
country and encouraged projects and initiatives aimed at promoting the 
development of UAE cultural products.42
In June 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-
operation opened the Offi ce for Public and Cultural Diplomacy (OPCD) 
to coordinate a range of entities and stakeholders from the private and 
public sectors both on federal and local levels. Its purpose is to help ex-
plaining what constitutes Emirati culture to international partners. The 
offi ce will also oversee the training for UAE diplomats focused on cultural 
diplomacy.43 The most promising artists, fi lmmakers, and writers from 
the United Arab Emirates will be encouraged to work with 183 embassies 
across the globe to showcase the best creative talent the country has to of-
fer. The head of the OPCD is the highly respected Minister of State Zaki 
Nusseibeh, who was a translator and close adviser of Sheikh Zayed, the 
country’s founding president. 
Emirati Films
Beyond the offi cial framework for public and cultural diplomacy, there 
are several projects run by diverse semi-private entities. One of them is 
Image Nation Abu Dhabi. The United Arab Emirates has quickly devel-
oped a movie industry that entertains and helps to spread Emirati values 
and culture abroad. Image Nation Abu Dhabi is one of the biggest fi lm 
producers in the Gulf and within only ten years it has grown to an im-
pressive size, partially due to state fi nancial support. Launched in 2008, 
the company’s mission is not only to build the foundations of a strong lo-
cal fi lm industry in the UAE, but also a fi lm and entertainment industry 
across the GCC and MENA. Image Nation uses a combination of local 
talents and international expertise. It also encourages young fi lmmakers 
to self-development through the program called “Arab Film Studio”. The 
company produces, TV series, documentaries, and entertainment for an 
42  Emirates News Agency, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302665018 (access 2.10.2020).
43  OPCD, https://opcd.ae/about-opcd/cultural-diplomacy/ (access 2.10.2020).
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audience throughout the world and is the fi rst UAE company to have 
multiple productions globally on Netfl ix.44
Since April 2016, Image Nation Abu Dhabi has been involved in the 
annual Emirati Film Review in Poland organized on a yearly basis by 
the Nahda Foundation and supported by the UAE Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs through its Embassy in Warsaw. Nahda operates as a non-profi t 
organization providing direct, open communication as a means towards 
a more profound and solid connection that leads to countering stereo-
types and increasing cooperation between Poles, Europeans, and Arabs.45 
The main purpose behind the Emirati Film Review in Poland was to 
inspire a change in the prevailing biased thinking and outlook towards 
the Arab world and culture.46 Films are strong information carriers and 
throughout the four editions a range of movies were selected to show ma-
jor differences but also similarities that can create a basis for future un-
derstanding. One of the key elements was to show the Emirates with all 
of its virtues and imperfections in order to highlight social and cultural 
challenges that people living in the UAE face in their everyday life. The 
fi lms were screened mostly in local studio cinemas in Kraków (Kino Pod 
Baranami), Warsaw (Kino LAB and the Museum of Asia and the Pacifi c) 
and Katowice (Kino Światowid). The tickets were charged according to 
cinemas pricelists. The Emirati Film Review was also an opportunity to 
meet fi lmmakers personally. Every year, a special guest was invited from 
the UAE to answer questions from the Polish audience and to give the 
Emirati perspective. For the fi rst event it was Nawaf Al Janahi, director 
of “Sea Shadow” (2011).
The UAE follows the centralized model of cultural diplomacy. Unlike 
in the case of France, however, the UAE lack organizations such as a cul-
tural institute which could play a role in facilitating cultural diplomacy 
projects abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was directly involved in 
coordinating and cooperating with local partners, e.g. Nahda. Still, the 
characteristics of the Emirati Film Review in Poland may suggest that 
the UAE follows the Domestic PR Model with annual events and by pur-
suing foreign policy goals through local partners. The goals themselves 
were specifi ed in the UAE Soft Power Strategy, and the case study of cin-
ema review fi ts the purpose of promoting a positive image of the country, 
countering stereotypes about it and attracting investors and tourists.
44  Image Nation Abu Dhabi, https://imagenationabudhabi.com/about-us/ (access 
2.10.2020).
45  Nahda, http://nahdafoundation.org.pl/about/ (access 2.10.2020).
46  Emirati Film Review, http://kinoemirackie.pl/?lang=en#przeglad (access 
2.10.2020).
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On top of that it seems adequate and wise to organize Q&A sessions to 
accompany fi lm screenings. The idea of broadening the scope of the events 
beyond simple fi lm screenings has been widely debated in academia since 
the 1990s, and a broader approach is aptly encompassed in the concept 
of fi lm festivals which create an interpretative framework around each 
fi lm.47 Q&A sessions, lectures, and the presence of artists establish great 
potential for cultural diplomacy. Foreign fi lms provide a window onto 
a different culture by offering an immersive experience of difference and 
thus the fi lm festival is a transnational space, communicating between 
cultures and allowing people to empathize with characters on screen.48 
Why Centralized? – The Analysis
The major difference in the case studies discussed here is that the 
United Arab Emirates presents a centralized model of cultural diplomacy. 
What could be the main reasons for this? The answer to this question is 
not straightforward and encompasses various elements. The unique con-
text for cultural diplomacy practices within the UAE, besides its short 
history and lack of extensive national heritage, is the partisan mentality 
of its people and the presence of an overwhelmingly expatriate workforce. 
The problem which arises is that out of a population of almost 10 million 
living in the country, Emiratis account for only one million. In order to 
face the future, when the natural resources are exhausted and the current 
economic model will need to be replaced with a new one, it seems inevi-
table that there the UAE will need to be unifi ed as one nation primarily 
loyal to a sovereign. Hence national culture, which already features prom-
inently in cultural exports, may serve well as a unifying mechanism, con-
veying the same comprehensive and consistent image inside the country. 
I presume that in light of shortages of human and cultural resources and 
the importance of the issue, the Emirati government has made a decision 
to coordinate the internal and external use of cultural assets itself. 
The centralized model may also result from the necessity of preparing 
cultural products before they are exported as there is nothing ready wait-
ing on a shelf. A difference between states such as France and Germany 
and the UAE, is that the former do not need to expend a great deal of ef-
fort to propose something culturally exclusive and related to their nation, 
whereas this is the case for the latter. Data presented in Elcano’s Global 
47  D. Iordanova, R. Rhyne, The Festival Circuit, St. Andrews Film Studies, Gate 
Press, St Andrews 2009, p. 2.
48  B. Nichols, Discovering Form, Inferring Meaning, New Cinemas and the Film Fes-
tival Circuit, „Film Quarterly”, no. 47(3), Oakland 1994, p. 18.
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Presence Report 2018 reaffi rms this view. Good public relations and vis-
ibility are the most important methods by which the Emirati government 
strives to achieve their designated goals in the fi eld of soft power and cul-
tural diplomacy. According to Elcano’s Report,49 the UAE is 22nd out of 
120 researched countries listed in the soft presence index. “Information”, 
followed by “Migration” and “Cooperation”, is the main variable that en-
sures the high position of the UAE in the list. “Information” in this case 
translates into a number of mentions in news of major international press 
agencies, such as the Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITARTASS, 
EFE, ANSA, and Xinhua. Interestingly, “Culture”, which stands for ex-
ports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions, radio, televi-
sion programs, and musical recordings), amounts to a 0% share in the 
UAE’s position.50 It means either that the data obtained from the WTO 
international trade statistics is not complete, or that movie production 
probably plays a minor role in the UAE and does not appear in the offi cial 
records. 
The UAE’s tribal character together with the centralized model may 
reinforce another important variable of Emirati cultural diplomacy: 
namely, the type of audience. The French and especially German ex-
amples show that cultural diplomacy is mostly facilitated outside of the 
sphere of public administration. The Goethe Institute specializes in 
presenting German fi lms and accompanying events in order to engage 
foreign low-profi le audiences in dialogue on the German image abroad. 
Unfortunately, in the UAE most of the events are directed to high-level 
offi cials or public administration representatives, which may be a result 
of the large power differential in Emirati society and perhaps the more 
prosaic reason that high-profi le audiences are more easily accessible for 
Emirati offi cials. The tribal aspect and its impact on the cultural diploma-
cy model can be inferred from Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions Theory. 
According to this theory, one of the factors characterizing any national 
culture is called “Power Distance”. People in societies exhibiting a large 
degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody 
has a place, and which needs no further justifi cation. In societies with low 
Power Distance, people strive to equalize the distribution of power and 
demand justifi cation for inequalities of power.51 
49  Elcano Global Presence Report 2018, https://www.globalpresence.realinstitu-
toelcano.org/en/data/Global_Presence_2018.pdf (access 2.10.2020).
50  Ibidem, p. 40.
51  Hofstede Insights, https://hi.hofstede-insights.com/national-culture (access 
2.10.2020). Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory is a framework for cross-cultural 
communication. It shows the effects of a society’s culture on the values of its mem-
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This indicator is quite low in the case of Germany (35 out of 100 
points) and very high (90) in the UAE. It means that it is natural for Emi-
rati people and administration that cultural diplomacy strategies drafted 
by its authorities should be fi rst of all perpetuated by state offi cials and 
directed to its counterparts abroad and not simply to whole societies. In-
deed, all the activities are supported by high-profi le state offi cials, but 
do not suffi ciently underline the role and meaning of the average Emi-
rati citizen. The Emirati Film Review in Poland established an exception 
which should be followed by the UAE in the future. The Offi ce for Public 
and Cultural Diplomacy also sets a good example by getting involved in 
low-profi le initiatives involving the contributions of local artists. The of-
fi ce communicates its actions through social media and on their webpage 
and it constantly develops further means and channels to keep in touch 
with the public, abroad and in the country. This trend should defi nitely 
be upheld in order to decentralize Emirati cultural diplomacy and stress 
the importance of using “organic” cultural fl ows as a political tool.
Conclusions
Public and cultural diplomacy strategies depend to a large extent on 
diverse political and geopolitical circumstances, as well as historical ex-
perience in the statecraft and nationhood. Consequently, “centralized” or 
“domestic PR” models in case of France are not equal to the same mod-
els applied in the UAE. In France, the centralized model is the result of 
the state’s unitarity and the special competences assigned to the central 
administration. Alternatively, in Emirates lack of cultural assets, human 
resources and extensive experience in statehood, requires strong and fi rm 
leadership for which centralized model allows more control. Therefore, 
distinction between neopropagandist and culturalist type of cultural di-
plomacy proposed by Mariano Zamorano may be more adequate in com-
paring cultural diplomacy practices beyond western world with its arche-
types, as it primarily differentiates intentions and goals of governments 
using culture as foreign policy tool.
In the cases of both France and Germany, the ability to answer the 
“identity question” – what does it mean to be French or German? – was 
preceded by years of shaping specifi c attitudes which are upheld by shared 
values, customs, and language. The uniqueness of culture is already im-
plicit. The French language is “a way of thinking and of action: a certain 
bers, and how these values relate to behavior, using a structure derived from factor 
analysis.
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way of asking the question and of fi nding solutions”.52 When the time 
came and the necessity of using culture in an institutionalized form arose, 
there was a ready product to be exported abroad. 
The United Arab Emirates has a very short history as a state, and there-
fore the time to defi ne the identity of its own people was very limited. It 
is even more complicated when we look at Emirati demographics, where 
90% of the society is established by non-citizen foreigners who already be-
long to other cultural circles and have diverse identities. The problem is 
complex, and it touches upon the issue of migration, naturalization, and 
the tribal mentality of Emiratis which makes them strict when it comes to 
accepting new members of the community. The cultural products which 
the Emirati authorities try to label as part of Emirati culture, whether it is 
falconry, Bukhur, henna, or pearl diving, are in fact typical for the whole 
Gulf region. The Arabic language is also not unique only to the Emirates. 
Therefore, very often, we may receive the impression that Emirati cul-
tural diplomacy is somewhat artifi cial. The political framework is drafted, 
but there is an obvious agenda and a diffi culty in fi lling this framework 
with meaningful cultural content.
It seems, the UAE government understood crucial role of the soft 
power tools such as public and cultural diplomacy, for the successful ful-
fi llment of its foreign policy goals. Its strategy, however is continuously 
developing and not fully shaped yet. Although certain practices, such as 
Emirati Film Review in Poland are similar to venues organized by France 
or Germany, it is far from copying their cultural and public diplomacy 
models. It appears obvious when we examine macro factors such as politi-
cal, cultural and geopolitical situation of these states. I presume that UAE 
drawing on experience of its European counterparts will use this particu-
lar knowledge to develop its own public and cultural diplomacy model go-
ing beyond previously known theoretical framework and therefore giving 
space for more detailed research in this area. 
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